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EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY: A THRESHOLD FOR
INHOLDER ACCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE ALASKA
NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVATION ACT
Galen G.B. Schuler
Abstract- Nineteenth Century federal land grants created a legacy of private lands
surrounded by federal land in the American West. Owners of such lands (inholders) were
routinely granted access across federal land by implicit common law rights until the 1960s
when federal land policy became more restrictive. In 1981, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) provided a statutory entitlement
for inholder access. Since then, the Ninth Circuit also has held that ANILCA preempts any
common law access rights. This Comment argues that the common law doctrine of easements
by necessity remains a threshold basis for inholder access, and that ANILCA must be
carefully construed to protect the property rights of inholders.
In 1960, a member of the Washington Law Review asked, "Is an
easement across federal lands implied when the United States has
granted a tract of land to which the grantee would otherwise have no
practical means of access?"' Based on the common law doctrine of
easements by necessity,2 she concluded that such grantees, called
inholders, were owners of easements across federal land.3 More than
thirty years later, however, inholder access across public lands remains
an unresolved legal controversy.
The heart of this controversy is evident in an emerging split between
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits of the U.S. Court of Appeals. The Ninth
Circuit has held that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act4 (ANILCA) provides inholders with a statutory entitlement to access
across federal land,5 but that ANILCA also preempts any common law
property claims by inholders.6 The Tenth Circuit agrees that ANILCA
provides a statutory basis for inholder access, but it maintains that
1. Marjorie D. Rombauer, Comment, Easements By Way of Necessity Across Federal Lands, 35
Wash. L. Rev. 105, 105 (1960).
2. See 3 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, The Law of Real Property 410, at 34-62 to 34-64
("When an owner of land conveys to another an inner portion thereof, which is entirely surrounded
by lands owned by the conveyor... a right of access across the retained land of the conveyor is
normally found."). See also infra part IV.A.
3. Rombauer, supra note 1, at 112-13.
4. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
6. See Adams v. United States, 3F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1993).
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inholder access rights based on the common law are not preempted by
ANILCA and may exist apart from ANILCA.7 This di.tinction is critical
because the discretion of a federal agency to grant and regulate inholder
access is more limited if inholder access rights are real property rather
than statutory entitlements.8
The discretion of federal agencies is of paramount importance when
the access claims of inholders are complicated by encounters with the
Endangered Species Act9 (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy
Acto (NEPA). District courts have attempted to resolve these
controversies without applying the doctrine of easements by necessity."
Yet, the failure to directly confront the issue of common law property
rights in access across the public domain has spawned new legal
questions that are still most appropriately answered by reference to the
doctrine of easements by necessity.
This Comment reviews the history of federal law and policy
governing the access rights of inholders in Part I. It then critiques the
Ninth Circuit's treatment of inholder access claims under current law in
Part II. Part III argues that the doctrine of easements by necessity
remains a valid threshold for inholder access rights. Finally, Part IV
explains how federal land-management agencies and courts should
regulate and adjudicate access claims of inholders with the common law
doctrine of easements by necessity as a threshold for ANILCA
entitlements.
7. See United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994).
8. See, e.g., Shultz v. Department of Amny, 10 F.3d 649, 662 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
Army took property subject to easements and may not assert that easement holders cross land subject
to the Army's permission); Kinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159, 160 (10th Cir. 1978)
(distinguishing between a private easement and a public entitlement to use a :oad).
9. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1531-1543 (1989)). Plum Creek Timber Company's request for access to its "Hemlock Point"
timber harvest in Montana was delayed for more than seven years by grizzly bear concerns. Plum
Creek alone has approximately 210,000 acres of timberland inholdings requiring access across
federal land. Telephone interview with James Kraft, Vice President of Corporate and Legal Affairs,
Plum Creek Timber Company (Feb. 7, 1994).
10. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1989)).
11. See, e.g., Alpine Lakes Protection Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 838 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Wash.
1993) (requiring more extensive NEPA review for 0.23 mile logging road easement granted to an
inholder by the Forest Service); Mountain Slates Legal Found. v. Espy, 833 F. Supp. 808 (D. Idaho
1993) (holding U.S. Forest Service may reasonably restrict inholder access to protect critical habitat
for chinook salmon); Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. 92-248-MA Civ. (D. Ore. 1992) (enjoining access
rights because Bureau of Land Management failed to consult Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the
Northern Spotted Owl).
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I. THE HISTORY AND STATUS OF INHOLDER ACCESS
RIGHTS
Nineteenth Century land-grant policies of the United States
government created a legacy of intermingled public and private land
ownership where state and private inholdings are completely surrounded
by federal lands. 2 Because of checkerboard-pattern land grants from
Congress, railroad companies became owners of a large share of these
inholdings. 3 Other inholdings were created through mining claims and
various settlement acts. 4
Until about 1960, the land management agencies of the federal
government routinely granted access rights across the public domain to
inholders.' 5 Since then, efforts to preserve wilderness areas, protect
endangered species, and conserve public resources have made the federal
government more reluctant to grant access rights.16  Consequently,
inholder access disputes frequently appear before the federal courts. At
the core of these disputes is the question whether access rights for
inholders arise from the common law doctrine of easements by necessity
or from federal statutes.
A. The Easement-by-Necessity Line of-Authority
While there has never been a controlling decision holding that an
easement by necessity may be had across federal land, several courts
have dealt with the question. The easement-by-necessity argument made
12. Approximately seventeen percent of the space within National Forest boundaries and forty
percent of the space within Bureau of Land Management district boundaries is private or state land.
Marion Clawson, The Federal Lands Revisited 230-33 (1983). See also Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (reviewing the history of land grants and sales from the public domain).
13. The railroads received a total of 131,350,534 acres from the public domain. Robert S. Henry,
The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American History Texts, in The Public Lands: Studies in the
History of the Public Domain 121, 122 (Vernon Carstensen ed., 1963).
14. See, e.g., Mining Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 251 (July 26, 1866); Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat.
392 (May 20, 1862).
15. "The Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture have taken the position that under the
Forest Management Act of 1897 they lack the authority to deny a right of way to anyone requesting
it." Marion Clawson & Burnell Held, The Federal Lands: Their Use and Management 216 (1957).
16. See Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1131-1136 (1989)). See also Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1989)). See also Stephen P. Quarles and Thomas R.
Lundquist, You Can Get There From Here: The Alaska Lands Act's Innovations in the Law ofAccess
Across Federal Lands, 22 Land & Water L. Rev. 346, 349-50 (1987).
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its federal court debut in Bydlon v. United States,7 where the Court of
Claims found a taking because an easement by necessity for aircraft
access had been proscribed by the United States. In Mackie v. United
States,"8 a federal district court used an easement-by-necessity test, but
found the element of necessity lacking due to the existence of alternative
access. The first appellate decision acknowledging thai an easement by
necessity may be had across a servient estate owned by he United States
was United States v. Dunn. 9 The Ninth Circuit remanded Dunn for a
factual determination of necessity, and therefore did not decide whether
an easement existed. In Utah v. Andrus," an easement by implication
and necessity was found, but it was appurtenant to state-owned school
trust lands, and possibly distinguishable as a special feature of
federalism.2" Finally, in Brendale v. Olney,22 an easerment by necessity
across Yakima Indian Reservation land was found by a federal district
court. Brendale held that an implied easement was created when the
federal government granted the patent for an allotment inholding.'
The easement-by-necessity line of authority reached its zenith in the
district court decision of Montana Wilderness Association v. U.S. Forest
Service.24 This controversy arose when the Burlington Northern Railroad
(BNRR) sought access across a wilderness study area to harvest timber
from an inholding. The district court held that BNRR had an access right
alternatively founded on an easement by necessity or an easement by
implication in the terms of the Northern Pacific Railroad land grant.'
This victory for easements by necessity was brief, however, as the case
17. 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
18. 194 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1961).
19. 478 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1973).
20. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
21. School trust lands are a unique class of property granted to states by the federal government
upon statehood. Trust lands are managed in trust for the purpose of generating revenues for public
education. Cf James R. Johnston, The Legal Framework for the Management of Washington s
Forested Trust Lands: Limits and Imperatives 1-2 (1994).
22. No. C-78-145 Civ. (E.D. Wash. 1981).
23. The origin of Brendale's title was the Dawes or Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (Feb. 8,
1887), which provided allotments of Indian land to individual tribal members. See No. C-78-145
Civ. (E.D. Wash., March 3, 1981). Brendale is perhaps distinguishable as a peculiarity of Indian
law, but it is a strong endorsement of easements by necessity because it held tihat the doctrine applies
even where the federal government's grant created an easement across land held in trust by the
United States for the quasi-sovereign Indians.
24. 496 F. Supp. 880 (D. Mont. 1980), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
25. Id. at 885. See also 13 Stat. 365 (July 2, 1864).
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was appealed, reversed, and then affirmed on other grounds. 6 In the
Ninth Circuit, the easement-by-necessity line of authority was preempted
by a statutory entitlement.27
B. The Statutory-Entitlement Line ofAuthority
The statutory-entitlement line of authority begins with the long-
standing policy of the U.S. Forest Service to grant access to inholders
under the Forest Reserve Organic Act of 1897.28 When the Attorney
General advised the Forest Service in 1962 that the Organic Act
protected only inholders who were "actual settlers," 9 the Forest Service
continued to grant access based upon an alternative clause of the same
law that allowed access for any "lawful" activity.3" In 1980, the Attorney
General criticized this path chosen by the Forest Service, but suggested
the Wilderness Act as another, more limited statutory entitlement to
access.31 Other statutes authorize the Secretaries of Interior and
Agriculture to grant access across federal lands, but such access is
discretionary and not an entitlement.32
The 1962 and 1980 Attorney General opinions reflect increasingly
restrictive views on inholder access. The 1962 Opinion treats inholder
access rights as strictly statutory in origin and therefore subject to
regulatory conditions and exactions of fees or reciprocal easements.33
The 1980 Opinion finds that the Forest Service may completely deny
access if it would harm the public interest.34 The 1980 Opinion also
declares that there can be no easement by necessity over lands of the
federal government.35 If this is true, then federal statutes are the sole
source of inholder access rights.
26. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
27. Id.
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1989). See also Clawson & Held, supra note 15, at 216.
29. Rights-of-Way Across Nat7 Forests, 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 127, 134-35 (1962) [hereinafter
Rights-of-Way, 19621.
30. Rights-of-Way Across Nat'l Forests, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 30, 32 (1980) [hereinafter
Rights-of-Way, 1980]. See also 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1989).
31. Rights-of-Way, 1980, supra note 30, at 47-54. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1134(a) (1989).
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 533 (1989). See also 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1989). These statutes allow
wide discretion in granting and regulating new easements, renewing expired easements for a term,
and granting special-use permits that are more akin to licenses than to property interests. Nowhere
do these statutes suggest that the applicant is entitled to receive the access permit.
33. Rights-of-Way, 1962, supra note 29, at 140.
34. Rights-of-Way, 1980, supra note 30, at 38-39.
35. Id. at 43.
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For many inholders, however, there were no statutes that secured them
access rights-that is, until the Ninth Circuit decided Montana
Wilderness Association v. U.S. Forest Service.36 In Montana Wilderness,
the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the district court's decision that
BNRR had access rights by implied easement or easement by necessity."
On a motion for reconsideration, however, the court affirmed on the
ground that the ANILCA, which was enacted while the appeal was
pending, granted access rights.38  ANILCA provides that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . .. the Secretary of
Agriculture shall provide such access to nonfederally owned land
surrounded by public land ... as the Secretary deems adequate to secure
to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof."
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of ANILCA has given Forest
Service inholders a statutory entitlement to access. Indeed, subsequent
court decisions have invoked ANILCA in support of access rights for
inholders.4° Yet, an essential question remains whether ANILCA
supports or supplants the common law access rights of inholders.
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAS OBSCURED THE NATURE AND
SCOPE OF INHOLDER ACCESS RIGHTS UNDER ANILCA
At the urging of the Montana Wilderness defendant and intervenor
(the U.S. Forest Service and BNRR, respectively), the Ninth Circuit
found an access entitlement under ANILCA.4" This was an apparent
victory for inholder access rights, but it prevented resolution of the
critical issue whether easements by necessity are the foundation of
inholder access rights. Consequently, there are tremendous
36. 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
37. The Ninth Circuit's first ruling on Montana Vilderness was issued on May 14, 1981 but was
never placed in official reporters because the Ninth Circuit reversed itself on August 19, 1981.
Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 16, at 363.
38. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1989).
40. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1993). Accord, Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Espy, 833 F. Supp. 808 (D. Idaho 1993); Native Ams. for Enola v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
832 F. Supp. 297 (D. Ore. 1993).
41. Montana Wilderness has been criticized as an abuse of legislative process by private interests
seeking to gain statutory rights of access. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge. Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation. 74 Va. L. Rev. 275,
294 (1988) (calling the ANILCA access provision "a great giveaway of federal property interests to
western landowners"). Ironically, rather than a "giveaway" of rights, ANILCA has been held to
preempt common law access rights. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
Inholder Access Rights Under ANILCA
inconsistencies when the executive branch implements and the courts
interpret ANILCA without reference to underlying common law property
rights.
A. Geographic and Jurisdictional Inconsistencies
Although the title of ANILCA suggests that it only applies to Alaska,
Montana Wilderness held that the subsection on access to nonfederal
inholdings applied to the entire "National Forest System."42 The court
was able to reach this conclusion because ANILCA did not incorporate a
definition of "National Forest System," which is defined elsewhere as
federally owned forests "throughout the United States."'43 Although the
court found the legislative history of ANILCA to be "sparse" and
"ambiguous," it considered the legislative history of the Colorado
Wilderness Act, passed three weeks later, to be "decisive" in extending
ANILCA-based access to National Forest System inholders anywhere in
the United States."
The Ninth Circuit's strained interpretation of ANILCA has resulted in
inholder access rights that vary by geographic location and by executive
agency administering the lands surrounding an inholding. In Montana
Wilderness, the Ninth Circuit extended ANILCA-based access rights to
all National Forest System inholders, but it was reluctant to extend those
same rights to Department of Interior inholders outside Alaska even
though Interior lands were addressed in a parallel subsection of the same
statute.45 The Interior Department has interpreted ANILCA as granting
access rights to Interior inholders nationwide,46 but the Supreme Court's
42. Montana Wildemesi Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). In its first ruling, the Ninth Circuit found that ANILCA only applied
to the State of Alaska and was of no relevance. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the
Ninth Circuit agreed to review the legislative history and found that the relevant Forest Service
clause of the Act applied nationwide. Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 16, at 363-64.
43. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F.2d at 954 (interpreting the meaning of 16 U.S.C. §
3210(a) in light of 16 U.S.C. § 1609).
44. Id. at 955-57. Montana Wilderness has been criticized as an abuse of legislative records to
find a dubious intent for a statute. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Va. L. Rev.
1295, 1370 (1990).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(b) pertains to "lands managed by the Secretary [of Interior]" while 16
U.S.C. § 3210(a) applies to the "National Forest System." In dictum, Montana Wilderness stated,
"Subsection (b), therefore, is arguably limited by its terms to Alaska .... Montana Wilderness,
655 F.2d at 954.
46. See Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 I.D. 165 (1984). The concurring opinion, however, finds
access rights by implication of necessity and rejects access rights for Interior inholders under
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decision in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambel147 casts doubt on
whether ANILCA applies so broadly." As such, outside of Alaska,
inholder access rights across Department of Interior lands probably exist
under common law while inholder access rights across National Forest
System lands are found under ANILCA.49 The only legal principle that
provides a unified and consistent standard for access under all
contingencies of geography, statute, and agency jurisdiction is the
common law doctrine of easements by necessity.
B. The Uncertain Nature and Scope ofAccess Rights Under ANILCA
The ANILCA subsection that grants access to inholders also provides
that access is "subject to such terms and conditions as, the Secretary of
Agriculture may prescribe.. . ."'0 This language allows broad agency
discretion that may conflict with any common law property rights of
inholders." The limits of the Secretary's discretion to impose terms and
conditions on access can only be understood by answering whether
ANILCA protects and supplements preexisting property rights or merely
provides a statutory entitlement that is independent anad preemptive of
any common law property rights.5" The Ninth Circuit's most recent
decision on ANILCA access rights, Adams v. United States,53 offers a
confused and unsatisfactory answer to this question.
Adams found that, under ANILCA, an inholder had an easement over
a Forest Service road. After this finding, the court wrote the following:
Our finding of an easement does not end our inquiry. This
conclusion leads inevitably to the question of the extent of the
ANILCA. Id. at 174-77.
47. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
48. Id. at 546-47,550-51. The Court found that ANILCA defines "public lands" as "land situated
in Alaska" and added that this defimition "applies as well to the rest of the statute." Ste also Quarles
& Lundquist, supra note 16, at 364 n.81 (explaining the Village of Gambell decision).
49. See George E. Powers, Jr., Comment, Gamesmanship on the Checkerboard: The Recurring
Problem of Access to Interlocked Public and Private Lands Located Within the Pacific Railroad
Land Grants, 17 Land & Water L. Rev. 429, 463 (1982).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1989). A potential problem arising from Montana Wilderness is that it
creates two classes of land: one favored by common law access rights and the other without them.
51. See Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 16, at 360 (noting that federal land managers may have
the discretion to declare a proposed development activity unreasonable and tc refuse to grant access).
52. See United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994) ("A determination of... [an
inholder's] patent or common law rights will play a pivotal role during the [ANILCA] permit
process the Forest Service seeks to enforce ...
53. 3 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1993).
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easement. Under common law, a party having an easement by
necessity is entitled to only one route, is entitled to reasonable use,
and is entitled to an easement width that allows such reasonable
use.
54
In this passage, the Adams court uses the common law to define the
nature and scope of access rights under ANILCA, but then seems to
contradict itself:
The Adamses [inholders] contend that an easement by implication
or by necessity was created when the United States granted the land
to their predecessors. Although the Adamses may have such an
easement under common law, we need not analyze this issue ....
Common law rules are applicable only when not preempted by
statute.5
In this sequence, the court first asks the appropriate question and
draws an answer from the common law doctrine. Adams then dismisses
that doctrine, and remands the case for "an order clearly delineating the
rights and responsibilities of both parties."" "On what basis?" one might
very well ask.
The Adams decision raises three fundamental questions. First, if the
inholder once owned a common law easement (the Ninth Circuit
suggests that they did), may federal law preempt that property interest
without committing an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment? Second, did Congress clearly intend that ANILCA
preempt property interests in implied easements? And third, if ANILCA
preempts the common law, by what standard should the rights and
responsibilities of the dominant and servient estates be decided? The
risk of uncompensated takings and a dubious preemptory intent of
Congress weigh against the summary dismissal of the doctrine of
easement by necessity. Moreover, federal agencies and courts will find it
difficult to define the limits of regulatory discretion without reference to
some standard that defines the nature and scope of inholder access rights.
Easement by necessity provides a ready standard and is arguably what
was intended by Congress when ANILCA was enacted.
54. Id. at 1259.
55. Id. (emphasis added). Contra JenkA, 22 F.3d at 1518 (holding that, notwithstanding ANILCA,
"the district court erred in declining to address... [inholder's] patent or common law claims.").
56. Adams, 3 F.3d at 1259.
315
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Ill. A PERMISSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF ANILCA: THE
DOCTRINE OF EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY REMAINS A
THRESHOLD FOR ANILCA-BASED ACCESS RIGHTS
ACROSS FEDERAL LAND
Although the Ninth Circuit decisions in Montana Wilderness and
Adams implicitly reject the doctrine of easement by necessity,57 it
remains a threshold for inholder access rights." There is no valid reason
to exempt the federal government from the doctrine,59 and there is a long
history of preserving the common law as it applies to tbderal lands and
conveyances.' To hold that ANILCA preempts common law rights is
contrary to this history and an impermissible, uncompensated taking of
private property."
A. Easements By Necessity Should Apply to Federal Lands
It has been suggested that sovereign immunity exempts the federal
government from easements by necessity.62 The federal courts have
never ruled on this exception, but commentators have overwhelmingly
criticized such an exemption.63 When the federal government enters into
agreements to sell land to private individuals, it steps down as sovereign
and acts in the same capacity as any other person.' Thus, when the
federal government grants lands that become inholdings, it is subject to
57. See supra notes 37, 55 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 52.
59. See infra note 63.
60. See infra notes 65, 76, 87, 106.
61. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
62. See 3 Powell & Rohan, supra note 2, ,10, at 34-84. See also 3 Herbert T. Tiffany, The Law
of Real Property § 793, at 290 (3d ed. 1939).
63. See 3 Powell & Rohan, supra note 2, 410, at 34-84 (concluding that allowing easements by
necessity over lands of the sovereign "is believed to represent the wiser holding."). Accord
Rombauer, supra note 1, at 113 (concluding "tbere is every reason, historically, to apply the doctrine
in favor of the grantee and his successors, even though the grantor is the federal government.'); 3
Tiffany, supra note 62, § 793 at 290 (arguing that the doctrine of easements by necessity should
apply to government conveyances); James W. Simonton, Ways By Necessity, 25 Colam. L. Rev.
571, 580 (1925) ("There is no good reason why the doctrine should not apply to state and federal
lands.").
64. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (holding that vihen the United States
disposes of the public domain, it "may deal with such lands precisely as a Vrivate individual may
deal with his farming property."). See also Richard White, It's Your Misfortune and None of My
Own 138 (1991). Addressing the historic land grant policy of the United States, White says, "The
federal government would, in effect, serve as a real estate agent instead of a landlord." Id.
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65the common law for interpretation of its conveyances.
Authorities that have clearly exempted the federal government from
the doctrine of easements by necessity have only done so by refusing
66such easements when they favor the federal government. For example,
in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,67 the Supreme Court held that the
United States could not claim an easement by necessity across private
inholdings. In 1980, the Attorney General argued that Leo Sheep
decisively eliminated all easements by necessity over federal land,68 but
the Attorney General misapplied the case. Leo Sheep was decided on the
ground that the federal government had the power of eminent domain,
and therefore could not assert necessity.69 Indeed, the district court
decision in Montana Wilderness distinguished Leo Sheep as denying
easements by necessity to the federal government because of its power of
eminent domain." Leo Sheep is also distinguishable because the asserted
easement by necessity was reserved rather than granted. The rule of
construing an easement by necessity in favor of the grantee and not the
grantor arguably limits Leo Sheep to denying easements by necessity
where they are reserved by the federal government as grantor.7 Strictly
interpreted, Leo Sheep has not eliminated the doctrine of easements by
necessity where a grantee of the federal government seeks access over
federal lands.7"
65. "It is true... that the disposition of such lands is a matter of the intention of the grantor, the
United States, and 'if its intention be not otherwise shown it will be taken to have assented that its
conveyance should be construed and given effect.., according to the law of the state in which the
land lies."' United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27 (1935) (quoting Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S.
574,595 (1922)).
66. See United States v. Rindge, 208 F. 611, 619 (S.D. Cal. 1913) (denying an easement by
necessity sought by the federal government and concluding it was "doubtful whether the doctrine of
implied ways of necessity has any application to grants from the federal government under public
land laws.").
67. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
68. Rights-of-Way, 1980, supra note 30, at 43. See also Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 16, at
350 (arguing that Leo Sheep suggests that the doctrine of easements by necessity does not apply to
federal lands).
69. Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 680 ("Jurisdictions have generally seen eminent domain and
easements by necessity as alternative ways to effect the same result.').
70. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D. Mont. 1980), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
71. See 3 Powell & Rohan, supra note 2, 410, at 34-67 (grantor may not derogate from his own
grant). See also Ralph E. Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property 594 (3d ed. 1981) (explaining that
the doctrine of easements by necessity favors grantees rather than grantors).
72. See Powers, supra note 49, at 464.
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B. Common Law Doctrines Often Apply to Federal Lands
The 1980 Opinion of the Attorney General on inholder access is
probably the most authoritative and comprehensive criticism of
easements by necessity across federal lands.73 The Opinion maintained
that the "application of the common law doctrine [of easement by
necessity] would be inconsistent with the established principles that the
intent of Congress in disposing of federal land must control, and that
rights in government land cannot be presumed to pass by implication."'74
In a seemingly contradictory statement, however, the Opinion concluded
that "access may be implied if it is necessary to effectuate the purpose for
which the land was granted."'75 This concession to implied access was
necessary to accommodate federal court decisions allowing implied
easements by necessity across federal land.76
With hair-splitting reasoning, the Attorney General argued that a fine
distinction separates the permissible "implied easeme:at defined by the
actual intent of Congress" from the "easement by nece;sity, which relies
on a presumed intent of the parties."77 Yet, according to the Attorney
General, the so-called "actual intent of Congress" is implied from the
"condition of the country when the grant was made, as well as the
declared purpose of the grant.""8 This conclusion simply favors one form
of common law implied easement over another.79
The Attorney General argued that the common law cannot serve as an
independent basis for inholder access because the intent of Congress,
found in a statute, controls land grants." But this does not preclude the
use of the common law to discern congressional intent and to interpret a
73. Rights-of-Way, 1980, supra note 30.
74. Id. at 42.
75. Id. at 39.
76. "An easement by necessity for some purposes could possibly have arisen when the United
States granted the patent to plaintiffs' predecessor in interest .... While nothing ordinarily passes by
implication in a patent, Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.), an implied easement may
arise within the scope of the patent." Id. at A4 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kinscherff v. United
States, 586 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978)).
77. Id. at41.
78. Id. at 43.
79. The doctrines of easement by necessity and easement by implication are both implied
easements and are often treated as one and the same doctrine. See Boyer, supra note 71, at 592 ("An
implied easement is created and proved not by the words of the deed or conveyance but by the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed or conveyance."). Seealso 3 Powell &Rohan,
supra note 2, 411.
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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controlling federal statute when it is an instrument of property
conveyance.1 The statute is simply subject to common law rules of
construction that are essentially no different from those advocated by the
Attorney General. It is only a question whether one presumes
congressional intent on the basis of immutable facts founded in physical
geography and legal boundaries (easement by necessity) or one implies
congressional intent by resorting to circumstances surrounding a federal
land grant (easement by implication). In either case, a legal fiction from
the common law is used to find an implied easement.82
Contrary to the Attorney General's opinion that only federal law
controls questions of private property interests in federal lands, the
federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have continued to use state
common law to interpret federal statutes granting access. In United
States v. 9,947.71 Acres83 and Wilkenson v. Department of Interior,84
federal courts construed access rights granted under Revised Statute
2477 (R.S. 2477)85 as private property rights defined by state law. In
United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, Inc.,86 the
Ninth Circuit assented to the use of state law in the construction of
federal conveyances under R.S. 2477.87 In Sierra Club v. Hodel,88 the
Tenth Circuit rejected an argument that state law does not control the
existence and scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way across Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) lands. Sierra Club held that refusing to apply state
law would conflict with "more than four decades of agency
precedent,... and over a century of state court jurisprudence."" And, in
81. See infra note 87.
82. See 3 Powell & Rohan, supra note 2, 410, at 34-66, 34-84 (explaining that intent is
considered to be a fictional substitute for necessity, and necessity alone is presumed sufficient
"unless a contrary intent is inescapably manifested .... "). See also 3 Herbert T. Tiffany, The Law of
Real Property § 793 (3d ed. Supp. 1994).
83. 220 F. Supp. 328, 331 (D. Nev. 1963).
84. 634 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1986).
85. Mining Act of 1866, 16 Stat. 251 (July 26, 1866). Commonly known as R.S. 2477, the
Mining Act of 1866 granted rights-of-way across the public domain. R.S. 2477 was codified at 43
U.S.C. § 932, and repealed by the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, § 706(a), Pub. L.
No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2793. All rights-of-way vested prior to 1976 were, however, expressly
preserved. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
86. 732 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1984).
87. Id. at 1413 (noting that while the scope of a federal land grant is a question of federal law,
such federal law may implicitly adopt a state rule of construction for its conveyances of property).
88. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 1081.
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Shultz v. Department of Army, 9° an Alaska inholder obtained an R.S.
2477 right-of-way across Department of Defense land because the Ninth
Circuit found that a prescriptive easement had been established under
state law.
The federal courts have also found common law easements created by
federal grants outside the context of R.S. 2477. In Burdess v. United
States,9 a federal district court found an easement by necessity where a
portion of an inholder's land was condemned by tae United States,
leaving the remaining land inaccessible. In Adams v. United States,92 the
Ninth Circuit's decision was strongly influenced by the common law,
and the court virtually admitted that inholders once owned easements by
necessity across federal land. 3 The access right found by Adams was an
"easement,"'94 suggesting a property interest that is more than a license,
privilege, or entitlement granted under statute.9" At the very least, Adams
seemed to acknowledge that, before ANILCA, inholders could
legitimately claim property rights in easements by necessity. Finally, in
United States v. Jenks,96 the Tenth Circuit held that, even after ANILCA,
inholders may have common law property rights in easements. These
cases raise a substantial question whether it is permissible for the Ninth
Circuit to interpret ANILCA as preempting common law easements by
necessity.
C. Preemption Is an Impermissible Interpretation ofANILCA
In Adams, the Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed the relevance of
easements by necessity with the assertion that "[c]ommon law rules are
applicable only when not preempted by statute."97  This statement is
misleading, however, because a statute may not simply preempt an
90. 10 F.3d 649, 660 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a homesteader obtained a prescriptive easement
even though he never pleaded that theory of common law and concluding that the law "does not
require him to prove that the right of way he asserts ... is wholly based on one property law theory
or another.').
91. 553 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
92. 3 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1993).
93. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
94. Adams, 3 F.3d at 1259.
95. An easement is "[a]n interest in land in and over which it is to be enjoyed, and is
distinguishable from a 'license' which merely confers personal privilege to do some act on the land."
Black's Law Dictionary 509 (6th ed. 1990).
96. 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
97. 3 F.3d at 1259.
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existing easement without compensation." Where ANILCA might
otherwise commit a taking requiring compensation, it is more reasonable
to interpret the statute as incorporating rather than preempting the
common law. An investigation of preemption supports this conclusion.
Preemption analysis must address three questions. (1) Did Congress
expressly preempt common law easements in the language of ANILCA;
(2) Do common-law easements conflict in fact with ANILCA; (3) Does
federal law occupy the field with regard to easements across the public
domain? "
The first and second questions can be addressed by reference to the
language of ANILCA and the Forest Service rules implementing
ANILCA. Preemption seems quite obvious where ANILCA begins:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law ...... ' But immediately
thereafter, Congress adopts the language of the common law by
guaranteeing access adequate for the "reasonable use and enjoyment" of
the inholder."'0  Moreover, the Forest Service's interpretation of
ANILCA suggests that, rather than creating a conflict in fact, ANILCA
accommodates the dictates of common law."02 Under the common law,
"the scope of the way should be expansive enough to allow the dominant
owner the reasonable enjoyment of his land. At the same time, the
expansion of the way must be consistent with the full reasonable
enjoyment of the servient estate .... ,1 0s
Under the federal rules implementing ANILCA, "adequate access" is
"a route and method of access to non-Federal land that provides for
reasonable use and enjoyment of the non-Federal land consistent with
98. United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910) (holding that the United States cannot take an
easement without compensating the owner for the value of the easement and the diminished value of
the dominant estate). Accord United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911); United States v. 57.09
Acres, 706 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 293 F.2d 822 (9th Cir.
1961).
99. See generally R. David Alnutt, Comment, FIFRA Preemption of State Common Law Claims
After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 68 Wash. L. Rev. 859, 860-62 (1993) (describing the
preemption tests).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1989).
101. Under ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1989), the inholder receives "access... adequate to
secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment [of land]." Similarly, under common law, the
inholder has "rights ... necessary for the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement." 3
Tiffany, supra note 82, § 802 at 196.
102. See United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The Forest Service itself
recognizes that any deed or common law access rights a landowner possesses may affect the terms of
the (ANILCA] permit... ").
103. 3 Tiffany, supra note 82, § 793, at 173. See also 3 Powell & Rohan, supra note 2, 416.
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similarly situated non-Federal land and that minimizes damage or
disturbance to National Forest System lands and resources."'" In short,
both ANILCA and the federal rules on inholder access functionally
affirm rather than preempt the common law.
As to the third question, whether federal law has "occupied the field,"
there is a consistent pattern of assent to the common law in the
construction of federal statutes governing access over the public
domain.'05 Each of the statutes reserving public land for management by
the Forest Service and BLM contains a savings clause recognizing
preexisting access rights across the public domain."° The Wilderness
Act also evinces a common law intent in its savings clause for access
rights."7 It reserves rights "necessary to assure adequate access;" those
access rights run with the land to "successors in interest;" and it
compensates the inholder if access is taken away.0 8 Rather than occupy
the field, it appears that Congress has intentionally preserved common
law property rights in the context of federal land statutes. Considering
the broad application of common law principles to access rights under a
variety of statutes, it is unlikely that Congress intended ANILCA to be
an exceptional preemption of common law property rights.
Recently, in United States v. Jenks, the Tenth Circuit implicitly
rejected the notion that ANILCA preempts the common. law.0 9 Instead,
it held that the Forest Service's regulatory duties under ANILCA are
correlative with the property rights of inholders."0 At best, ANILCA's
104. 36 C.F.R. § 251.111 (1993).
105. See, e.g., supra notes 65, 76, 87.
106. See 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1989) ("Nothing in ... this title shall be construed as prohibiting the
egress or ingress of actual settlers ... [n]or... prohibit any person from enteing upon such national
forests for all proper and lawful purposes . . .'); 43 U.S.C. § 1769 (1989) ("Nothing in this
subchapter shall have the effect of terminating any right-of-way or right-of-use heretofore issued,
granted, or permitted.").
107. The Wilderness Act provides that:
In any case where State-owned or privately owned land is completely sturounded by national
forest lands within areas designated by this chapter as wilderness, such Slate or private owner
shall be given such rights as may be necessary to assure adequate access to such State-owned or
privately owned land by such State or private owner and their successors in interest, or the State-
owned land or privately owned land shall be exchanged for federally owned land in the same
State of approximately equal value ....
16 U.S.C. § 1134(a) (1989).
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994). See also supra notes 52, 55 and
accompanying text.
110 Jenks, 22F.3dat 1513.
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preemption of the common law is dubious. At worst, preemption is
simply an impermissible interpretation of ANILCA because it results in
uncompensated takings of property."'
IV. ADJUDICATING ANILCA-BASED ACCESS RIGHTS ACROSS
FEDERAL LANDS WITH THE DOCTRINE OF EASEMENT BY
NECESSITY AS A THRESHOLD
Under ANILCA, inholder access is provided subject to the terms and
conditions of the Forest Service."' It is true that the right of access
under ANILCA is not absolute.'1 3 But if the assertion that ANILCA
protects common law access rights is valid, then it is true that the
discretion of the Forest Service in regulating inholder access rights is
also not absolute. What exists is a condition of correlative rights and
duties that are jointly determined by the common law and ANILCA.'14
A. Determining Necessity
When an inholder brings a claim for access under ANILCA, the Forest
Service must first determine whether the inholder qualifies for access.
The Forest Service, in essence, adjudicates a claim to a valuable property
right, and it is limited in its discretion to. a factual determination of
inholder rights under the common law and ANILCA.
There are three elements that must be present for an easement by
necessity: (1) original unity of ownership, (2) severed through
conveyance, and (3) necessity." 5  The fact that the party seeking an
easement was not a party to the original conveyance is immaterial. 116
Furthermore, the fact that the landlocked parcel has never been used does
not indicate that the easement by necessity has been abandoned or
111. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112. See 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1989). See also 36 C.F.R. § 251 (1993).
113. See Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1993).
114. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. See also 3 Tiffany, supra note 82, § 802, at 196
("[R]ights and duties of dominant and servient owner are correlative, and neither may unreasonably
exercise rights to the injury of the other.").
115. See 3 Powell & Rohan, supra note 2, 410, at 34-68 to 34-79. See also 3 Tiffany, supra
note 62, § 793, at 289. See also Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of Property § 8.5, at 447
(1984).
116. See 3 Tiffany, supra note 62, § 793, at 290, 293 (the appurtenant easement by necessity
passes with the dominant estate).
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terminated." 7 For inholders whose title originates in a grant from the
federal government, access rights will usually turn on the element of
necessity.
In those cases where there is absolute physical necessity, the Forest
Service has no discretion and must grant a right-of-way.' The fact-
finding role of the Forest Service becomes somewhat discretionary,
however, where the inholder claims a "reasonable necessity" caused by
conditions such as insurmountable physical barriers." 9 When reasonable
necessity is asserted, the Forest Service need not grant access merely on
the grounds of convenience. 2 ° The burden is upon the inholder claimant
to show why the requested route of access is necessary and not merely
convenient. '
2
Consistent with the common law, Forest Service regulations require
an inholder to apply for access by disclosing any historic access to the
inholding and rights of access that exist over non-federal land."2 This
facilitates a threshold determination whether necessity exists. The
regulations should be carefully limited, however, where they require the
inholder to demonstrate a "lack of any existing rights or routes of access
available by deed or under State or common law."" If the inholder
owns an easement by necessity across federal lands, an application for
access under ANILCA should not be a waiver of that common law
right. 24 Additionally, even if the inholder may use a state law such as
private condemnation of access across nonfederal lands, the inholder is
not obligated to exhaust that remedy." The Forest Service's discretion
in finding alternative means of access is constrained where a conveyance
117. Id. at 292. See also id. § 819, at 374 ("A way of necessity has been rcegarded as coming to an
end when the necessity ceases.').
118. See Cunningham et al., supra note 115, § 8.5 at 447.
119. Id. See, e.g., Alpine-Sisters Right-of-Way Environmental Assessment, Avery Ranger
District, Idaho Panhandle National Forest (January 1994) (recommending a 200-foot alternative
when the inholder claims a 0.6 mile right-of-way as necessary for profitable logging).
120. See 3 Tiffany, supra note 62, § 794 at 295.
121. See 3 Tiffany, supra note 82, § 793 at 171.
122. 36 C.F.R. § 251.112(b) (1993).
123. 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(1) (1993) (emphasis added).
124. The Justice Department has argued that an application for access under ANILCA
extinguishes any claim of prior inholder access rights. United States v. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. 232, 233
(D. N.M. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
125. See 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(4) (1993) (requiring the Forest Service to "ensure that: (4)
When ... the best route.., is across non-Feleral lands, the applicant landomer has demonstrated
that all legal recourse to obtain reasonable access across adjacent non-F-deral lands has been
exhausted or has little chance of success.").
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by the federal government created the necessity, and thus, the federal
government can have no legal expectation that the inholder will obtain
access across the land of a third party.
12 6
B. Location
One matter clearly within the initial discretion of the Forest Service is
the selection of the location of the easement. The common law upholds
the right of the servient estate to fix the location of the easement
provided the route selected gives reasonable access.127 This protects the
correlative rights to reasonable enjoyment of the servient estate, and it
fulfills the statutory and regulatory duties of the Forest Service to
minimize impacts on federal resources. 128 The route selected for the way
of necessity is not necessarily the shortest, but rather the most suitable.'2 9
C. Conditions for Use
Once an easement has been located under ANILCA, the Forest
Service has limited discretion in establishing conditions for use.13
Under the common law:
[T]he only restrictions on the mode of use is [sic] that it shall not
interfere unreasonably with the rights of the owner of the servient
estate, and . . . in the absence of its creation for any specific
purpose, to further any legitimate and useful purpose to which the
dominant tenant may naturally and reasonably be devoted.... "
The correlative duty of the Forest Service is to provide only such
access as is reasonable. It has the right to demand that access not
damage the land or its resources.' 2
Whether by statute, regulation, or otherwise, the government may not
diminish inholder access rights to less than those of an implied
126. See 3 Tiffany, supra note 62, § 793, at 292.
127. Id. § 804, at 329.
128. The Forest Service is required to locate easements so as to minimize adverse impacts on
soils, fish and wildlife, threatened and endangered species, scenic, cultural, and other values of
federal land. 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(2) (1993).
129. See Cunningham et al., supra note 115, § 8.5. See also supra note 119.
130. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
131. 3 Tiffany, supra note 62, § 803, at 322-23.
132. See United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006
(1989).
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easement. 3 3 However, ANILCA regulations require the Forest Service
to obtain either a monetary fee or reciprocal right of way at "fair market
value" from the inholder.' 34  If the regulated inholder is already the
owner of an easement by necessity, the government may not impose a fee
for its use,13 5 nor may it exact a reciprocal easement for which it has no
legitimate claim.
136
D. Balancing Inholder Rights andAgency Discretion
When ANILCA is implemented without the common law as a
threshold for inholder rights, Forest Service discretion goes too far. In
United States v. Jenks,137 an inholder was required to apply for an access
permit to use an existing road across National Forest lands. The inholder
conceded that some regulation is allowed, but objected to regulations that
"(1) impose a fee; (2) make use of the easements conditional; (3) allow
the Forest Service to terminate the easements; and (4) make the transfer
of easements discretionary." ' 8 Insofar as easements by necessity are a
real property interest, the district court's reply was either evasive or
simply wrong. It stated: "Contrary to the defendant's contentions, I find
that these regulations are reasonable and do not unlawfully infringe on
the defendant's property rights."'39 The Tenth Circuit recently reversed
the district court's finding regarding the reasonableness of the terms of
the ANILCA permit.141
The limits of discretion are also a critical matter when ANILCA
encounters the ESA or NEPA.' 41 Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
133. See 3 Tiffany, supra note 62, § 811, at 353-54. ("[Nor may [the owner of the servient
estate] change or diminish the easement by rules or regulations affecting its use, in the absence of
power so to do expressly or impliedly reserved in the grant of the easement.').
134. See 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(b), (c) (1993).
135. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
136. Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that exaction of an
easement is a taking). Contra Rights-of-Way, 1962, supra note 29, at 145-46.
137. 804 F. Supp. 232 (D. N.M. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.
1994).
138. Id. at237.
139. Id.
140. The court declined ruling on the inholder's Fifth Amendment takings claim because "the
Forest Service, in its brief ... maintained for the first time that the special use permit. . . 'was
merely a proposal and was subject to negotiation."' United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1520
(10th Cir. 1994).
141. See supra notes 9, 10.
326
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Espy142 exemplifies the careful balancing that courts must employ to
protect the property rights of inholders while allowing agencies to protect
public resources. Mountain States upheld the access rights of inholders
while carefully circumscribing the road closure and snow plowing
conditions that the Forest Service could impose to protect critical habitat
for threatened chinook salmon. 43 When the courts do not recognize that
property rights are the threshold for access under ANILCA, however,
this balance is lost.
For example, in Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. U.S. Forest
Service,'44 a grant of access was reversed on the ground that the Forest
Service's analysis of cumulative effects was insufficient under NEPA.
The court reasoned that the Forest Service's failure to consider
cumulative impacts in the watershed "cannot be characterized as a 'truly
informed exercise of discretion,' nor can it be said -to amount to the
requisite 'hard look' at the environmental consequences of granting the
permits in question."1 45 This statement suggests that the court ordered a
more thorough analysis for a determination on the question of granting
the permits rather than on the issue of locating the access route. The
court either misunderstood agency discretion under ANILCA, or it
ignored the rule that an agency's discretion limits the scope of inquiry
under NEPA.
146
Where an agency lacks discretion to refuse some compulsory act, it is
considered a "ministerial action."'47  Such ministerial actions do not
amount to "major federal action," and are therefore exempt from
compliance with NEPA.'48 Under ANILCA, the Forest Service has no
discretion to deny access for a qualified inholder.149 Therefore, NEPA
review of access rights under ANILCA is limited to the Forest Service
decision on location and conditions of access. 5 ' Alpine Lakes extends
142. 833 F. Supp. 808 (D. Idaho 1993).
143. Id. at 817-21.
144. 838 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
145. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
146. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.18, 1508.25 (1992).
147. Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n., 911 F.2d 1283, 1295 (8th Cir. 1990).
148. Id. Accord, South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
822(1980).
149. See Native Ams. for Enola v. U.S. Forest Serv., 832 F. Supp. 297, 301 (D. Ore. 1993)
(holding that refusal by the Forest Service to issue an ANILCA access permit would have been an
abuse of discretion). See also 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (granting access to nonfederal inholdings
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision oflaw").
150. See Forest Conservation Council v. Espy, 835 F. Supp. 1202, 1217 (D. Idaho 1993) (holding
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the scope of NEPA review to "cumulative impacts"'' that cannot
conceiveably affect the Forest Service's choice of location and
conditions that minimize impacts to federal land. It is the duty of the
Forest Service to minimize impacts on each access site regardless of
cumulative impacts. When the scope of NEPA review is extended
beyond agency discretion, it infringes on inholder property rights.
Agency discretion goes too far when ANILCA is interpreted without the
doctrine of easements by necessity as a threshold.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit considers ANILCA an adequate basis for inholder
access to private land completely surrounded by National Forest land.
Yet, reliance on ANILCA alone creates inconsistencies in federal land
management and engenders unce-tainty regarding the breadth of agency
discretion in granting and regulating access rights. Moreover, it risks
infringement on the preexisting property rights of inholders. The Tenth
Circuit recognizes this danger and upholds the property rights of
inholders even where access is granted under ANILCA. In the interests
of administrative consistency, judicial economy, and fairness to property
owners, it is time for all courts to accept that the doctrine of easements
by necessity provides the standard for determining the ultimate nature
and scope of all inholder access rights, including those under ANILCA.
that access under ANILCA is a "baseline" for NEPA analysis).
151. See 40 C.F.RL § 1508.25(a)(2) (1992).
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